Digital identity, digital euro: how far can the digitisation of our lives go?
The short answer, before anything else. No, the European digital identity is not mandatory for citizens: the regulation that creates it explicitly says the opposite. No, the digital euro doesn’t exist yet, and no decision to issue it has been made. Yes, however, an infrastructure is being built, piece by piece, with precise deadlines: end of 2026 for identity wallets, end of 2027 for mandatory acceptance by certain actors, 2029 at the earliest for a possible digital euro. And yes, the real civil-liberties question isn’t in any single brick taken in isolation, but in what their assembly would produce.
This dossier sorts through it. Every claim points to an official text: regulations published in the Official Journal of the European Union, European Central Bank communications, Commission, Parliament and Council documents, French legal texts. No advocacy pieces, no social media screenshots. Three levels of reading, clearly separated: what’s adopted, what’s in preparation, what remains a scenario.
| Topic | Adopted | In preparation | Scenario |
|---|---|---|---|
| Identity wallet (EUDI Wallet) | Regulation (EU) 2024/1183, in force | National rollout by 24/12/2026 | De facto obligation through generalised use |
| Wallet acceptance | Mandatory for regulated sectors and very large platforms from 24/12/2027 | Implementing acts, transpositions | Extension of the mandatory acceptance scope |
| Age verification in France | SREN Law (2024), Arcom framework | EU-wide age verification app, ban on social media for under-15s (passed by the French Assembly on 26/01/2026, still in the legislative process) | Generalised identity verification at the entry point of the web |
| Chat Control (message scanning) | Voluntary scanning extended until 03/04/2028 | Permanent regulation (CSAR): 5 trilogues without agreement, resuming 29/09/2026 | Mandatory scanning including encrypted messages |
| Digital euro | None. Only the ECB’s technical preparation phase has started | Regulation under negotiation, pilot envisaged mid-2027 | Issuance from 2029, “programmable” currency |
1. The European digital identity: what the text actually says
The legal foundation is Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 of 11 April 2024, known as “eIDAS 2.0”, published in the Official Journal on 30 April 2024 and in force since 20 May 2024. It requires every member state to make at least one European Digital Identity Wallet (EUDI Wallet) available to its citizens and residents by 24 December 2026 at the latest. In practice: an app that lets you store and present certified attestations (identity, licence, diplomas) and prove a specific attribute — for example that you’re of legal age — without revealing anything else.
Three points in the text deserve to be read as written, because they contradict both the alarmist and the overly reassuring narratives.
Use is voluntary for the citizen. The regulation sets out the principle of a digital identity deployed on a voluntary basis and controlled by the user. The text also includes a non-discrimination clause: access to public and private services cannot be refused on the grounds that a person doesn’t use the wallet. It’s written, it’s enforceable. Anyone claiming today that “digital identity will be mandatory for everyone” is going beyond the text.
Acceptance, on the other hand, is becoming mandatory for certain actors. From 24 December 2026, online public services requiring identification will have to accept the wallet. From 24 December 2027, the obligation extends to regulated private sectors (banking, telecoms, healthcare, transport, energy, education) and very large online platforms, whenever a user chooses to present it. That’s an obligation on the administration and business side, not on the citizen side. But it’s what will make the infrastructure exist at scale.
The honest point of caution: de facto obligation. A tool can remain legally voluntary and become socially unavoidable. If tomorrow age verification, opening a bank account, or accessing certain social networks in practice go through the wallet because it’s the simplest path, “free choice” becomes theoretical for part of the population. That’s not a done deal, it’s a possible trajectory — and it’s precisely the moment when democratic debate still has traction.
Where does the actual rollout stand? The technical implementing acts were adopted at the end of 2024 (including Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2979 on the integrity and functionalities of wallets). States are moving at their own pace: Germany, for instance, announced its state wallet for early January 2027, after the deadline. France is building on the France Identité base. The December 2026 deadline will be met unevenly, and that’s information in itself: the infrastructure is coming, but slower and less uniformly than the official calendar suggests.
2. Age verification: France as the testing ground
It’s in France that the “identification and the internet” question is furthest along, and it doesn’t come from Brussels but from Paris. The SREN Law No. 2024-449 of 21 May 2024 gave Arcom, the French media regulator, the power to impose a technical age-verification framework on adult sites, adopted on 9 October 2024 (decision no. 2024-20, after the CNIL’s opinion) and applicable since 11 January 2025. Its core requirement, mandatory since 11 April 2025 for at least one proposed method: “double anonymity” — the site doesn’t know the visitor’s identity, and the age-proof provider doesn’t know which site is being visited. France’s supreme administrative court (Conseil d’État) validated the regulatory scheme in July 2025.
The next layer is under construction: the French National Assembly voted on 26 January 2026 for a bill banning social media for under-15s. The text is still going through the legislative process, but its logic is clear: to ban access for minors, you have to verify everyone’s age. In parallel, the European Commission has been developing, since 2025, an age-verification app designed to work alongside the EUDI Wallet.
The double-anonymity principle is a genuine technical answer to a genuine problem. But every extension of scope (from adult sites to social media, then potentially beyond) brings us closer to an internet where proving something about yourself becomes the condition of entry. The question to ask decision-makers isn’t “are you for or against protecting minors” — no one serious is against that. It’s: “what structural safeguards prevent the age-verification tool from becoming a general identification tool?”
👉 Looking for a social space that doesn’t make signing up conditional on an ID document? Mad2Moi works with a simple email, free to get started.
3. Chat Control: the exact state, without dramatisation
We’ve published a full, regularly updated article on this topic: Chat Control in 2026: who is really scanning your messages. A summary of the situation as of August 2026, since it’s essential to the bigger picture.
Two texts coexist. The first, the temporary derogation from the ePrivacy directive (Regulation (EU) 2021/1232), allows unencrypted platforms (Gmail, Messenger, Instagram, Snapchat, Xbox among others) to voluntarily scan communications for child sexual abuse material. Rejected by the European Parliament on 26 March 2026 by a single vote on the decisive amendment, it expired on 3 April, was relaunched by the Council in late June as a standalone regulation, and Parliament failed to block it on 9 July 2026 (314 votes for rejection, 361 were needed — an absolute majority of members). Voluntary scanning is therefore legal again until 3 April 2028.
The second, the permanent CSAR regulation (proposed by the Commission on 11 May 2022), which would make detection mandatory, remains stuck: five trilogue rounds without agreement, the last one failing on 29 June 2026 over scanning without individual suspicion. The Council’s own legal service concluded, in an opinion dated 10 June 2026, that even “voluntary” scanning amounts to a blanket search of communications that is difficult to reconcile with Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Negotiations resume on 29 September 2026 under the Irish presidency.
This case perfectly illustrates the method of this dossier: neither “it’s been voted, we’re all under surveillance” (false — the permanent text is stuck) nor “nothing’s happening” (false — voluntary scanning is legally running and July’s procedural workaround is well documented). The reality is in between, and that’s where it’s actually decided.
4. The digital euro: a timeline, not a currency
Let’s start with what doesn’t exist. There is no digital euro in circulation. There is no decision to issue it. What exists is a project with a precise framework.
On the legislative side, the Commission presented the “single currency package” in June 2023, including a proposed regulation establishing the digital euro (COM(2023) 369). The Council of the EU agreed its negotiating position on 19 December 2025. Parliament still has to adopt its own for trilogues to conclude; the ECB’s working assumption is that the regulation could be adopted sometime in 2026 — an assumption that is not guaranteed.
On the ECB side, the preparation phase launched in November 2023 concluded on 29 October 2025, the date on which the Governing Council opened a new technical preparation phase. The ECB states it plainly: no issuance decision has been made, and it can only act once the legal framework is adopted. The published timeline: selection of payment service providers, a 12-month pilot exercise starting in the second half of 2027, and the capacity for a first issuance in 2029 if everything lines up.
On substance, three elements of the project directly address the most common fears, and they deserve to be stated honestly. The project includes a holding limit (around 3,000 euros per person in the working assumptions), with no interest paid: the digital euro is designed as a payment method that complements cash, not a substitute for a bank account. The ECB and the draft regulation state that the digital euro would not be a programmable currency — meaning it couldn’t be made subject to usage restrictions (expiry dates, categories of allowed purchases). Finally, an offline functionality is planned, with a level of privacy for proximity payments presented as close to cash.
The point of caution here, again, isn’t in the current text but in its durability. A public digital payment infrastructure, once built, can be modified by a future legislator. The “non-programmable” guarantee is only as solid as the law that carries it, and a law can change. That’s not an argument for shouting conspiracy; it’s an argument for demanding that these guarantees be enshrined at the highest possible legal level and monitored over time. The gradual disappearance of cash (42% of in-store transactions in France in 2024, down from 68% in 2016, according to the Banque de France) makes this vigilance all the more necessary: the day cash becomes marginal, the untraceable alternative disappears on its own, without any law having banned it.
5. The convergence: the real issue
Taken in isolation, each brick is defensible, and this dossier has tried to show that. A voluntary digital identity with selective disclosure can protect privacy better than sending a photo of your ID card to an unknown site. Double-anonymity age verification is better than sending a selfie and a passport to an offshore provider. A public digital currency can be a counterweight to non-European private payment networks.
The societal issue starts when you put the pieces together. An identity wallet accepted everywhere, age verification built on that wallet, a public digital means of payment, and a legal framework for scanning communications that gets rebuilt every two years: each of these elements has its own justification, but their sum sketches an architecture where identification, payment and communication all run through interconnected, supervised infrastructures. No text plans this convergence as a goal. No text structurally forbids it either.
That’s exactly why a petition titled “Garantir le libre choix face à l’identité numérique” (“Guaranteeing free choice in the face of digital identity”) was filed with the French National Assembly on 4 May 2026 (petition no. 5871). It asks for three simple guarantees: that using digital identity remains a choice, not an obligation; that alternatives accessible without digital identification stay available for public and private services; and that free, informed consent be guaranteed in every use case. The petition can be viewed and signed on the French National Assembly’s official platform — it’s a French-language, French-parliament petition, but open to any signatory, and its context is detailed in our dedicated article.
6. The paradox we live with at Mad2Moi: securing without identifying
It has to be said, because it’s what gives this dossier its concrete grounding: we’re not talking about these topics as theorists.
Mad2Moi is a French dating platform, available in seven languages and used well beyond our borders: the questions covered in this dossier (identity, encryption, age verification) come up in exactly the same way for our members in Germany, Italy, Spain or the Netherlands — and this dossier is available in each of those languages too. Free choice isn’t a slogan for us: the platform was built from 2021 onward by welcoming people who refused to let a personal decision dictate their social life, including at the moment when that refusal cost the most. Our number-one security problem is romance scams — “brouteurs” networks that exploit loneliness to extort money. We’ve dedicated a full guide to this scourge (French-language page) and it’s been the subject of two public broadcasts. And here’s the paradox we face every day: the simplest answer to fake profiles would be to demand an ID document from every member. We made the opposite choice: sign-up by simple email, optional video-selfie verification for a badge, human moderation of reports, and no retention of identity documents.
Why? Because on a dating platform, a database of the real identities of thousands of people, tied to their intimate lives, would be precisely the worst asset to build. Data leaks from age-verification services and dating apps have proven this repeatedly. Security through blanket identification doesn’t remove the risk — it concentrates it.
What our experience has taught us — and it applies well beyond our own case — is that fighting fraud is won through behaviour (detecting scam patterns, moderation, user education), not through pre-emptively filing every honest person. That’s transposable to the European debate. The question “how do you protect people without identifying everyone” has technical answers: selective disclosure, double anonymity, targeted measures based on suspicion with judicial oversight. They exist in the texts. The democratic fight is about making sure they stay the rule, and blanket identification the exception.
👉 Want to debate all this with people who think for themselves? Mad2Moi isn’t just about dating: it’s also thematic rooms where members discuss health and free choice, crypto and alternative currencies, digital freedoms and critical thinking, freely, among verified members and without an algorithm deciding what you see. Join the community with a simple email, free, no commitment, no ID required.
FAQ
Will the European digital identity be mandatory?
For citizens, no: Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 sets out voluntary use and bans refusing a service to anyone who doesn’t use the wallet. For certain actors (banks, telecoms, very large platforms), accepting the wallet becomes mandatory by the end of 2027. The real risk isn’t a legal obligation but a de facto one if usage becomes widespread.
Has Chat Control been adopted?
The permanent regulation, no: five negotiation rounds have failed, the last on 29 June 2026, and talks resume on 29 September 2026. Voluntary scanning of unencrypted services, however, was relaunched in July 2026 and runs until 3 April 2028.
Will the digital euro replace cash?
Not according to the texts: the draft regulation presents it as a complement, and a parallel text from the 2023 package aims to guarantee the legal-tender status of cash. The real risk factor is the spontaneous erosion of cash usage, which doesn’t depend on any law.
Will the digital euro be programmable?
The ECB and the draft regulation rule out programmability: no usage restrictions, expiry dates, or imposed purchase categories. That guarantee holds for as long as the legal framework carrying it isn’t changed — which justifies lasting vigilance rather than definitive trust or panic.
When could the digital euro exist?
At the earliest in 2029, and only if the regulation is adopted (ECB assumption: sometime in 2026), if the pilot planned from mid-2027 succeeds, and if the Governing Council then decides to issue it. None of these three conditions is secured today.
What does the petition filed with the French National Assembly ask for?
Three guarantees: that using digital identity remains a choice, not an obligation; that alternatives accessible without digital identification stay available for public and private services; and that free, informed consent be guaranteed in every use case. Filed on 4 May 2026, it’s open for signature until 19 June 2029.
Found this dossier useful? Two ways to act: sign the petition on the French National Assembly’s official platform, and join a community that already practises what it defends: sign-up by email, zero ID document retention, free discussion rooms. Free to get started.
Official sources
Digital identity: Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 of 11 April 2024 (EUR-Lex, ELI: data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1183/oj); European Commission page on the EUDI regulation (digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu); Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2979.
Chat Control: Regulation (EU) 2021/1232 (ePrivacy derogation); Regulation (EU) 2024/1307 (first extension); European Parliament vote results of 26 March and 9 July 2026 (europarl.europa.eu); CSAR draft regulation of 11 May 2022 (COM(2022) 209).
Digital euro: draft regulation COM(2023) 369 (European Commission); ECB Governing Council statement of 29 October 2025 and pilot project page (ecb.europa.eu); Banque de France digital euro dossier (banque-france.fr); Council negotiating position of 19 December 2025 (consilium.europa.eu).
France: Law No. 2024-449 of 21 May 2024 (SREN, legifrance.gouv.fr); Arcom decision no. 2024-20 of 9 October 2024 on the age-verification framework (legifrance.gouv.fr and arcom.fr); CNIL opinion no. 2024-067 of 26 September 2024 (cnil.fr); petition no. 5871 “Garantir le libre choix face à l’identité numérique” (petitions.assemblee-nationale.fr/initiatives/i-5871).
What the community is saying